University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Propositions

California Ballot Propositions and Initiatives

1994

Commission on Judicial Performance.

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/ca_ballot_props
Recommended Citation
Commission on Judicial Performance. California Proposition 190 (1994).
http://repository.uchastings.edu/ca_ballot_props/1107

This Proposition is brought to you for free and open access by the California Ballot Propositions and Initiatives at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Propositions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

,

....III

rI90

3

111111

q

Commission on Judicial Performance.
Legislative Constitutional Amendment.
Official Title and Summary Prepared by the Attorney General
COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE.
LEGISLATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.

• Transfers authority to remove or discipline judges from California Supreme Court to Commission
on Judicial Performance.
• Provides for public disciplinary proceedings against judges and former judges and specifies the
circumstances warranting their removal, retirement, suspension, admonishment, or censure.
• Increases non-judicial citizen membership on the Commission.
• Specifies authority of Commission to discipline former judges.
• Provides immunities to persons employed by or making statements to the Commission.
• Specifies review processes for Commission determinations and requires the Supreme Court to
issue Code of Judicial Ethics.

Summary of Legislative Analyst's
Estimate of Net State and Local Fiscal Impact:
• Not likely to have a significant fiscal impact on the state.

Final Votes Cast by the Legislature on ACA 46 (Proposition 190)
Assembly: Ayes 74
Noes 1·

10

Senate: Ayes 29
Noes 1

G94

Analysis by the Legislative Analyst
the Supreme Court; two members of the State Bar of
California, who would be appointed by the Governor; and
six public members (two representatives appointed by
each of the following: the Governor, the Senate Rules
Committee, and the Speaker of the Assembly).
The amendment provides that, when the commission
begins formal proceedings against a judge, the charges
and all subsequent papers and proceedings shall be open
to the public. Also, this measure permits the commission,
rather than the Supreme Court, to retire or remove a
judge, or to censure a judge or former judge. Such actions
could be reviewed by the Supreme Court. In a case
against a Supreme Court Justice, a special panel of
appellate court judges would review the case. The
measure also permits the commission to publicly
re~rimand a judge without the judge's consent. The
commission could disqualify a judge from performing his
or her duties when the commission begins a formal
proceeding that charges the judge with misconduct or
disability. The commission also may bar a former judge
who has been censured or removed from receiving a
judicial appointment or assignment to serve any
California state court.
The measure provides that persons who give
statements to the commission are protected from civil
lawsuits or adverse actions that may be taken against
them by their employers as a result of their statements.
Also, it protects commission members and employees
against lawsuits that may be brought as a result of their
work.
Finally, the amendment requires the commission to
provide, upon request of the Governor of any state, the
Proposal
President of the United States, and the California
This constitutional amendment changes the Commission on Judicial Appointments, confidential
composition of the commission and makes a number of information on disciplinary actions taken against a judge
changes to the .procedures for disciplining judges. Among who is an applicant for another judicial appointment.
its provisions, the measure increases the membership of
the commission from nine to eleven members and Fiscal Effect
This measure is not likely to have a significant fiscal
increases the number of public members so that they are
a majority on the commission. Specifically, the members impact on the state because its changes are largely
would include three judges, who would be appointed by procedural in nature.

Background
Under the California Constitution, the Commission on
Judicial Performance handles complaints against judges.
The commission investigates charges of misconduct by a
judge in office or failure or inability of a judge to perform
his or her duties.
The commission is composed of nine members. The
members.include five judges, who are appointed by the
California Supreme Court; two members of the State Bar
of California, who are appointed by the State Bar's
governing body; and two public members, who are
appointed by the Governor and approved by the
California Senate. Each member is appointed to a
four-year term, and no member may serve more than two
terms.
The commission receives complaints against judges
each year (950 complaints in 1993). The complaints and
investigations are handled on a confidential basis. For
less serious cases of misconduct, the commission may
privately reprimand a judge; the Supreme Court may
review such a reprimand. The commission may also
publicly reprimand a judge if the judge consents.
In other cases, the commission makes formal charges
and a hearing is held. In 1993, nine cases (out of 950
complaints) proceeded to a hearing. The commission may
recommend to the Supreme Court that a judge be
censured, retired, ot removed. Such actions may then be
taken by the Supreme Court. Since 1961, the commission
has made 32 recommendations to the Supreme Court to
censure or remove a judge. The Court upheld the
recommendations in
29 cases; one case is pending.
I

For the text of Proposition 190 see page 18
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Commission on Judicial Performance.
Legislative Constitutional Amendment.
Argument in Favor of Proposition 190

THE TIME HAS COME TO REFORM
hold judges to the same standard where serious
CALIFORNIA'S JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE SYSTEM.
misconduct is at issue.
VOTE "YES" ON PROPOSITION 190.
PROPOSITION 190 STOPS JUDGES FROM
In 1960, California created the first judicial discipline ESCAPING DISCIPLINE BY RETIRING OR
commission in the United States. It was a model for all RESIGNING WITH CHARGES OF MISCONDUCT
50 states and the District of Columbia. But now PENDING AGAINST THEM.
California has fallen behind the rest of the nation. A
Proposition 190 will prevent judges charged with
system that was once innovative has become antiquated. misconduct from avoiding discipline by retiring or
The California commission, which is made up of a resigning with charges pending. Judges should be held
majority of judges, has held only one public hearing in the accountable for improper conduct on the bench.
last six years. Clearly, it is inappropriate to have judges Proposition 190 allows the commission to publicly
disciplining their peers in a secret environment.
discipline former judges for conduct which occurred while
PROPOSITION 190 ENSURES PUBLIC CONTROL they held judicial office. This will provide the public with
OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE.
important information about judges who resign with
The California commission is currently composed of charges pending and then go to work in the private sector
five judges, two lawyers and two public citizens and there as arbitrators or private judges.
is no requirement that formal disciplinary proceedings be
Proposition 190 is an important and timely reform
open to the public. Proposition 190 would eliminate measure. Judges are public servants and playa critical
judicial domination of the commission in favor of a public role in our society. The public must have confidence and
majority. Specifically, under Proposition 190, the trust in those holdingJ'udicial office. PROPOSITION 190
Commission on Judicial Performance would be made up
S OF
of three judges, two attorneys and six public members. PLACES JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE IN THE HAND
A PUBLIC MAJORITY WILL ENSURE A FAIR AND A BROAD PANEL OF PUBLIC CITIZENS, JUDGES
AND ATTORNEYS AND OPENS ALL FORMAL
FIRM SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE.
PROCEEDINGS TO THE PUBLIC. JUST AS OTHER
THE PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO KNOW WHEN STATES HAVE DONE IN RECENT YEARS,
JUDGES ARE CHARGED WITH MISCONDUCT.
, CALIFORNIA MUST ELIMINATE SECRECY AND
Under Proposition 190, the commission would be ENSURE INTEGRITY IN THE DISCIPLINARY
required to open all formal proceedings against judges to PROCESS.
the public. Currently, all hearings and com.mission
VOTE ''YES'' ON PROPOSITION 190.
documents, including the actual charges agamst the
WILLIE L. BROWN, JR.
judge, are secret. WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF
Speaker, California State Assembly
CHARGES OR PROCEEDINGS, THE PUBLIC
ALFRED E. ALQUIST
CANNOT HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIAL
California State Senator
SYSTEM. Just as we require criminal proceedings and
attorney discipline proceedings to be open, we should also
MARC POCHE
Associate Justice, California Court of Appeal

Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 190
There's no question but that the current system of Commission on Judicial Performance should be
hearings by the California Commission on Judicial comprised equally of judges, public members and lawyers
Performance should be changed. There's no argument in order to balance viewpoints and distribute the power
about that. Creating a requirement of open, public of appointment among the branches of government.
hea~ngs re~pect~n~ the relatively fe~ form~l complaints Appointments should reflect the diversit~ of Cali~o~nia's
agamst Cahforma.Ju?ge~, howev~r~ IS far dIff~rent from population and not be made on the baSIS of POhtICS or
turnip.g the C.ommIsslOn m~o.a pohtIcally-appom~ed body. ideology. The Commission's independence must be
That s. the VICe of Pr.opo~ItlOn 190. I!lstead sImply?f protected from the appearance of outside interference.
chan.gmg the ConstIt~tI0n. to reqUIre open, p,;!bhc . We should reject Proposition 190 and re-write it with the
hearmgs of charges agams~ Judge~ (whI~h ar~ relatIvely public hearing requirement and equal power of
fe~ ~ompared to the ~,OOO Judges m Caht:orma) Speaker appointment among the branches of state government.
WIlhe Brown has wntten a measure whIch transcends
that elemental principle. While it may seem difficult to
QUENTIN L. KOPP
divorce the desired constitutional revision in the nature
State Senator
of the hearings on judicial discipline from the selection
(Independent·San Francisco/San Mateo)
process for the Commission, Californians should realiz.e
JUDGE JOSEPH A. WAPNER
it is injurious to our separation of powers form of
Retired Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court
government and the independence of the judicial branch
ARLEIGH WOODS
of government to adopt Proposition 190. Rather, as the
Presiding Justice, California Court of Appeal
American Bar Association has stated, the members of the
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Arguments printed o~ this page are the opinions of the authors and have not been checked for accuracy by any official agency.
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Commission on Judicial Performance.
Legislative Constitutional Amendment.
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Argument Against Proposition 190
DON'T BE FOOLED! This alleged attempt to regulate "public member majority" in reality will be a majority of
the judiciary is really an attempt to politicize the people with close political ties to the Governor, the
Commission on Judicial Performance. This power grab Assembly Speaker and State Senate leadership.
changes the structure of the Commission by allowing
The framers of our Constitution knew that an
politicians to appoint a majority of its members. Eight independent judiciary is one of the greatest safeguards of
out of the 11 members would be appointed by politicians, liberty. While California needs a strong, effective
giving them a degree of power over the judicial branch Commission on Judicial Performance, it does not need
unknown anywhere else in the United States.
. and can't afford, an ill-conceived, poorly drafted
The public needs a judicial disciplinary system constitutional amendment which gives a handful of
uninfluenced by partisan politics. Proceedings before the insiders unprecedented control over judicial conduct.
Commission should be opened to the public, but this
The proposal also removes disciplinary powers from
proposal threatens the independence of the Commission the California Supreme Court and transfers such powers
and will divert its focus to the expectations of the to the politicized Commission. Such shift raises serious
appointing parties.
due process issues and will result in costly and needless
There is a better alternative, which the Legislature litigation at taxpayer expense.
ignored. The American Bar Association has just
Vote No! California deserves a judiciary that is
completed a five year study conducted by prominent accountable and independent. Send a message to the
citizens, judges and lawyers and adopted its first Legislature to keep partisan politics out of the judicial
national model for judicial disciplinary proceedings. The disciplinary process. Send them back to the drawing
model recommends a commission with equal numbers of board to examine the work done by leading national
citizens, judges, and lawyers appointed by the Governor, authorities and give California a system which will place
State Supreme Court and the State Bar. This measure, us in the forefront of judicial discipline.
however, takes the commendable, worthwhile goal of
QUENTIN L. KOPP
producing an accountable, open system of judicial
State Senator
discipline and turns it into a dangerous, irresponsible
(I-San Francisco/$an Mateo)
attack on the judicial branch of government. Its proposed
JUDGE JOSEPH A. WAPNER
Retired Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court
commission has virtually unchecked power; its so-called

Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 190
The opponents claim that Proposition 190 will create a
politicized body. TWENTY-FOUR STATES HAVE
CREATED COMMISSIONS WITH EQUAL OR
GREATER PUBLIC MEMBERSHIP ON THEIR
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY COMMISSIONS. These
commissions represent a variety of appointing powers.
Just as with Proposition 190; these states recognized
that a broad base of constitutional appointing powers
does not sacrifice the integrity of the Judiciary..
IN FACT, NO STATE HAS ADOPTED THE ABA
MODEL. Instead, a number of states have successfully
changed to a public majority membership after having
commissions dominated by judges. The drafters of the
ABA model specifically refused to recommend that
disciplinary commissions have a majority of public
members because they thought the issues would be too
complicated. Everyday, jurors are asked to decide serious
legal issues, yet the lawyers and judges who drafted the
ABA proposal feared the public would not understand

G94

when a judge has acted inappropriately.
PROPOSITION 190 WILL CREATE A MORE
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION BY MAKING IT AN
INSTITUTION SEPARATE' FROM ANY ONE
INFLUENCING BODY. Proposition 190 specifically
provides for a broad base of appointing powers-the
Supreme Court, the Governor, and the Legislature-so
that no one branch of government can dominate this
important body.
Proposition 190 protects the public by providing for
their participation. It is good, sound public policy.
VOTE ''YES'' ON PROPOSITION 190.
WILLIE L. BROWN, JR.
Speaker, California State Assembly
ALFRED E. ALQUIST
California State Senator
TERRY B. O'ROURKE
Judge, San Diego Superior Court

Arguments printed on this page are the opinions of the authors and have not been checked for accuracy by any official agency.
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Proposition 189: Text of Proposed Law
This amendment proposed by Assembly Constitutional
Amendment 37 (Statutes of 1994, Resolution Chapter 95)
expressly amends the Constitution by amending a
section thereof; therefore, new provisions proposed to be
added are printed in italic type to indicate that they are
new.
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE I, SECTION 12

SEC. 12. A person shall be released on bail by
sufficient sureties, except for:
(a) Capital crimes when the facts are evident or the
presumption great;
(b) Felony offenses involving acts of violence on
another person, or felony sexual assault offenses on
another person, when the facts are evident or· the
presumption great and the court finds based upon clear
and convincing evidence that there is a substantial

likelihood the person's release would result in great
bodily harm to others; or
(c) Felony offenses when the facts are evident or the
presumption great and the court finds based on clear and
convincing evidence that the person has threatened
another with great bodily harm and that there is a
substantial likelihood that the person would carry out
the threat if released.
Excessive bail may not be required. In fixing the
amount of bail, the court shall take into consideration the
seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal
record of the defendant, and the probability of his or her
appearing at the trial or hearing of the case.
A person may be released on his or her own
recognizance in the court's discretion.

Proposition 190: Text of Proposed Law
This amendment proposed by Assembly Constitutional
Amendment 46 (Statutes of 1994, Resolution Chapter
111) expressly amends the Constitution by adding a
section thereto and amending sections thereof; therefore,
existing provisions proposed to be deleted are printed in
strike9ut type and new provisions proposed to be added
are printed in italic type to indicate that they are new.

immediately sUGGeed the term that expires 9n N9vember
3, 1933, shall serve a 2 year term.
(2) Of the State Bar members app9inted t9
immediately sUGGeed terms that expire 9n DeGember 31,
1933, 9ne member shall serve f9r a 2 year term.
(1) Two members appointed by the Supreme Court to a
term commencing March 1, 1995, shall each serve a term
of 2 years and may be reappointed to one full term.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE VI
(2) One attorney appointed by the Governor to a term
First-That Section 8 of Article VI thereof is amended
commencing March 1, 1995, shall serve a term of 2 years
to read:
SEC. 8. (a) The
Commission
on
Judicial and may be reappointed to one full term.
Performance consists of 2 judges 9f G9urts 9f appeal, 2
(3) One citizen member appointed by the Governor to a
judges 9f superi9r G9urts one judge of a court of appeal, term commencing March 1, 1995, shall serve a term of 2
one judge of a superior court, and one judge of a years and may be reappointed to one full term.
municipal court, each appointed by the Supreme Court; 2
(4) One member appointed by the Senate Committee on
members of the State Bar of California who have Rules to a term commencing March 1, 1995, shall serve a
practiced law in this State for 10 years, each appointed term of 2 years and may be reappointed to one full term.
by its g9veming b9dy the Governor; and 2 6 citizens who
(5) One member appointed by the Speaker of the
are not judges, retired judges, or members of the State Assembly to a term commencing March 1, 1995, shall
Bar of California, app9inted by the G9vern9r and serve a term of 2 years and may be reappointed to one full
appr9ved by the Senate, a maj9rity 9f the membership term.
G9nGUrring 2 of whom shall be appointed by the Governor,
(6) All other members shall be appointed to full 4-year
2 by the Senate Committee on Rules, and 2 by the Speaker terms commencing March 1, 1995.
of the Assembly. Except as provided in subdivision (b), all
Second-That Section 18 of Article VI thereof is
terms are for 4 years. No member shall serve more than 2 amended to read:
4-year terms, or for more than a total of 10 years if
SEC. 18. (a) Ajudge is disqualified from acting as a
appointed to fill a vacancy.
.
judge, without loss of salary, while there is pending (1) an
Commission membership terminates if a member indictment or an informatian charging the judge in the
ceases to hold the position that qualified the member for United States with a crime punishable as a felony under
appointment. A vacancy shall be filled by the appointing California or federal law, or (2) a reG9mmendati9n
power for the remainder of the term. A member whose petition to the Supreme Court to review a determination
term has expired may continue to serve until the vacancy by the Commission on Judicial Performance fur rem9val
has been filled by the appointing power. Appointing 9r retirement 9f the to remove or retire a judge.
powers may appoint members who are already serving on
(b) On reG.9mmendati9n Gf the The Commission on
the commission prior to March 1, 1995, to a single 2-year Judicial Performance may disqualify a judge from acting
term, but may not appoint them to an additional term as a judge, without loss of salary, upon notice of formal
thereafter.
proceedings by the commission charging the judge with
(b) To create staggered terms among the members of judicial misconduct or disability.
the Commission on Judicial Performance, the following
(c) The Commission on Judicial Performance Gr Gn its
members shall be appointed, as follows:
Gwn m9tiGn, the Supreme CGurt may shall suspend a
(1) The G9urt 9f appeal member app9inted t9 judge from office without salary when in the United
18
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States the judge pleads guilty or no contest or is found
guilty of a crime punishable as a felony under California
or federal law or of any other crime that involves moral
turpitude under that law. If the conviction is reversed,
suspension terminates, and the judge shall be paid the
salary for the judicial office held by the judge for the
period of suspension. If the judge is suspended and the
conviction becomes final, the Supreme Court Commission
on Judicial Performance shall remove the judge from
office.
(c) On recommendation of
(d) Except as provided in subdivision (fJ, the
Commission on Judicial Performance the SQpreme Court
may (1) retire a judge for disability that seriously
interferes with the performance of the judge's duties and
is or is likely to become permanent, and or (2) censure a
judge or former judge or remove a judge for action
occurring not more than 6 years prior to the
commencement of the judge's current term or of the
former judge's last term that constitutes wHf:ul. willful
misconduct in office, persistent failure or inability to
perform the judge's duties, habitual intemperance in the
use of intoxicants or drugs, or conduct prejudIcial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office
into disrepute. The Commission on Judicial Performance
may-, or (3) publicly or privately admonish a judge or
former judge found to have engaged in an improper
action or dereliction of duty, subject to review in the
Supreme Court in the manner provided for review of
causes decided by a CQurt of appeal. The commission may
also bar a former judge who has been censured from
receiving an assignment, appointment, or reference of
work from any California state court. Upon petition by the
judge or former judge, the Supreme Court may, in its
discretion, grant review of a determination by the
commission to retire, remove, censure, admonish, or
disqualify pursuant to subdivision (b) a judge or former
judge. When the Supreme Court reviews a determination
of the commission, it may make an independent review of
the record. If the Supreme Court has not acted within 120
days after granting the petition, the decision of the
commission shall be final.
~

(e) A judge retired by the Supreme Court commissio.n
shall be considered to have retired voluntarily. A judge
removed by the Supreme Court commission is ineligible
for judicial office, including receiving an assignment,
appointment, or reference of work from any California
state court, and pending further order of the court is ,
suspended from practicing law in this State. The State
Bar may institute appropriate attorney disciplinary
proceedings against any judge who retires or resigns from
office with judicial disciplinary charges pending.
~

(fJ A recomme:adation of determination by the
Commission on Judicial Performance ~ to admonish
or censure , removal or retirement of a judge or former
judge of the Supreme Court or remove or retire a judge of
the Supreme Court shall be determined reviewed by a
tribunal of 7 court of appeal judges selected by lot.
(£) If, after conducting a preliminary investigation, the
Commission on Judicial Performance by vote determines
that formal proceedings should be instituted:
(1) The judge or judges charged may re(}uire that
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formal hearings be public, unless the Commission on
Judicial Perfurmance by vot,e finds good cause fur
confidential hearings.
(2) The Commission on Judicial Performance may,
without further review in the Supreme Court, issue a
public reproval with the consent of the judge fur conduct
warranting discipline. The public reproval shall include
an enumeration of any and all formal charges brought
against the judge which have not been dismissed by the
commission.
(3) The Commission on Judicial Performance may in
the pursuit of public confidence and the interests of
justice, issue press statements or releases or, in the event
charges involve moral turpitude, dishonesty, or
. corruption, open hearings to the public.
(g) The Commission on Judicial ,Perfurmance may
issue explanatory statements at any investigatory stage
,.,,'hen the subject matter is generally knewn to the public.
(h) The Judicial Council shall make rules
implementing this section and providing for
confidentiality of proceedings.
(g) No court, except the Supreme Court, shall have
jurisdiction in a civil action or other legal proceeding of
any sort brought against the commission by a judge. Any
request for injunctive relief or other provisional remedy
shall be granted or denied within 90 days of the filing of
the request for relief A failure to comply with the time
requirements of this section does not affect the validity of
commission proceedings.
(h) Members of the commission, the commission staff,
and the examiners and investigators employed by the
commission shall be absolutely immune from suit for all
conduct at any time in the course of their official duties.
No civil action may be maintained against a person, or
adverse employment action taken against a person, by any
employer, public or private, based on statements presented
by the person to the commission.
(i) The Commission on Judicial Performance shall
make rules implementing this section, including, but not
limited to, the following:
(1) The commission shall make rules for the
investigation of judges. The commission may provide for
the confidentiality of complaints to and investigations by
the commission.
(2) The commission shall make rules for formal
proceedings against judges when there is cause to believe
there is a disability or wrongdoing within the meaning of
subdivision (d).
(j) When the commission institutes formal proceedings,
the notice of charges, the answer, and all subsequent
papers and proceedings shall be open to the public for fLll
formal proceedings instituted after February 28, 1995.
(k) The commission may make explanatory statements.
(l) The budget of the commission shall be separate from
the budget of any other state agency or court.
(m) The Supreme Court shall make rules for the
conduct of judges, both on and off the bench, and for
judicial candidates in the conduct of their campaigns.
These rules shall be referred to as the Code of Judicial
Ethics.
Third-That Section 18.5 is added toArticle VI thereof,
to read:
19

SEC. 18.5. (a) Upon request, the Commission on
Judicial Performance shall provide to the Governor of any
State of the Union the text of any private admonishment,
advisory letter, or other disciplinary action together with
any, information that the Commission on Judicial
Performance deems necessary to a full understanding of
the commission's action, with respect to any applicant
whom the Governor of any State of the Union indicates is
under consideration for any judicial appointment.
(b) Upon request, the Commission on Judicial
Performance shall provide the President of the United
States the text of any private admonishment, advisory
letter, or other disciplinary action together with any
information that the Commission on Judicial
Performance deems necessary to a full understanding of
the commission's action, with respect to any applicant
whom the President indicates is under consideration for
any federal judicial appointment.
(c) Upon request, the Commission on Judicial
Performance shall provide the Commission on Judicial

Appointments the text of any private admonishment,
advisory letter, or other disciplinary action together with
any information that the Commission on Judicial
Performance deems necessary to a full understanding of
the commission action, with respect to any applicant
whom the Commission on Judicial Appointments
indicates is under consideration for any judicial
appointment.
(d) All information released under this section shall
remain confidential and privileged.
(e) Notwithstanding subdivision (d), any information
released pursuant to this section shall also be provided to
the applicant about whom the information was requested.
(fJ "Private admonishment" refers toa disciplinary
action against a judge by the Commission on Judicial
Performance as authorized by subdivision (c) of Section
18 of Article VI, as amended November 8, 1988.
Fourth-That this measure shall become operative on
March 1, 1995.

· Proposition 191: Text of Proposed Law
This amendment proposed by Senate Constitutional
Amendment 7 (Statutes of 1994, Resolution Chapter 113)
expressly amends the Constitution by amending sections
thereof; therefore, existing provisions proposed to be
deleted are printed in Strik8Qut t¥P8 and new provisions
proposed to be added are printed in italic type to indicate
that they are new.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE VI

First-That Section ,I of Article VI thereof is amended
to read:
SEC. 1. The judicial power of this State is vested in
the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, and
municipal courts, and justiG8 GQurts. All courts are,
courts of record.
Second-That Section 5 of ATticle VI ,thereof is
amended to read: .
SEC. 5. (a) Each county shall be divided into
municipal court and justiG8 GQurt districts as provided by
statute, but a city may not be divided into more than one
district. Each municipal and justiG8 court shall have one
or more judges. Each municipal court district shall have
no fewer than 40,000 residents; provided that each county
shall have at least one municipal court district. The
number of residents shall be determined as provided by
statute.
(b) On the operative date of this subdivision, all
existing justice courts shall become municipal courts, and
the number, qualifications, and compensation' of judges,
officers, attaches, and employees shall continue until
changed by the Legislature. Each judge of a part-time
municipal court is deemed to have agreed to serve full
time and shall be available for assignment by the Chief
Justice for the balance of time necessary to comprise a
full-time workload.
Th8re shall 08 a muniGipal GQurt in 8aGh distrlGt Qf
mQr8 than 40,000 r8sidents and a jUStiG8 GQurt in 8aGh
distriGt gf 40,000 resid8nts Qr 18ss. Th8 num08r Qf
r8sidents shall 08 aSG8rtain8d as prQvid8d O¥ statut8.
(c) The Legislature shall provide for the organization
and prescribe the jurisdiction of municipal and juStiG8

20

courts. It shall prescribe for each municipal court aad
prQvid8 fur 8aGh juStiG8 GQurt the number, qualifications,
and compensation of judges, officers, and employees.
(.b)
(d) Notwithstanding th8 prQvisiQns Qf subdivision (a),

any city in San Diego County may be divided into more
than one municipal court Qr juStiG8 GQurt district if the
Legislature determines that unusual geographic
conditions warrant such division.
Third-That Section 6 of Article VI thereof is amended
to read:
SEC. 6. The Judicial Council consists of the Chief
Justice and one other judge of the Supreme Court, 3
judges of courts of appeal, 5 judges of superior courts, g
and 5 judges of municipal courts, and 2 jUdg8S QfjustiG8
GQurts, each appointed by the Chief Justice for a 2-year
term; 4 members of the State Bar appointed by its
governing body for 2-year terms; and one member of each
house of the Legislature appointed as provided by the
house.
Council membership terminates if a member ceases to
hold the position that qualified the member for
appointment. A vacancy shall be filled by the appointing
power for the remainder of the term.
The council may appoint an Administrative Director of
the Courts, who serves at its pleasure and performs
functions delegated by the councilor the Chief Justice,
other than adopting rules of ,court administration,
practice and procedure.
To improve the administration of justice the council
shall
survey
judicial . business
and
make
recommendations to the courts, make recommendations
annually to the Governor and Legislature, adopt rules for
court administration, practice and procedure, not
inconsistent with statute, and perform other functions
prescribed by statute.
The Chief Justice shall seek to expedite judicial
,business and to equalize the work of judges. The Chief
Justice may provide for the assignment of any judge to
G94

